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On November 7, 1848 William H. Robertson rose early and rushed to the post office in Bedford, a town in
Westchester County, New York. The young lawyer was brimming with excitement because two weeks earlier,
the Whigs in the county?s northern section had nominated him as their candidate for the New York State
Assembly. Only twenty-four years old and a rising legal star, Robertson hoped that holding political office
would launch his nascent career. After casting his ballot at the Bedford Post Office, Robertson paid a visit to
Sheriff James M. Bates, his political manager, to await the election results. Robertson?s intelligence, collected a
week before Election Day, that “news from every part of the district is favorable,” proved accurate. The Whig
attorney heard later that evening that he had defeated his Democratic opponent, with 57% of the vote. To
celebrate, Robertson and Bates feasted on “chickens, turkeys, oysters, and Champaign” before retiring around
midnight at Philer Betts? Hotel. The following afternoon, they boarded the 3:00 PM train from Bedford to the
county seat of White Plains, seventeen miles south. There, the two triumphant Whigs gossiped and caught up
with their counterparts from Westchester?s usually Democratic southern section. Hearing of their friends?
overwhelming victories surprised Robertson, leading him to exclaim, “The Whigs have carried almost
everything!” Indeed, the Whigs had swept every elective office in Westchester County. [excerpt]
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On November 7, 1848 William H. Robertson rose 
early and rushed to the post office in Bedford, a town in 
Westchester County, New York.  The young lawyer was 
brimming with excitement because two weeks earlier, the 
Whigs in the county‟s northern section had nominated him as 
their candidate for the New York State Assembly.  Only 
twenty-four years old and a rising legal star, Robertson hoped 
that holding political office would launch his nascent career. 
After casting his ballot at the Bedford Post Office, Robertson 
paid a visit to Sheriff James M. Bates, his political manager, to 
await the election results.  Robertson‟s intelligence, collected 
a week before Election Day, that “news from every part of the 
district is favorable,” proved accurate.  The Whig attorney 
heard later that evening that he had defeated his Democratic 
opponent, with 57% of the vote.  To celebrate, Robertson and 
Bates feasted on “chickens, turkeys, oysters, and Champaign” 
before retiring around midnight at Philer Betts‟ Hotel.  The 
following afternoon, they boarded the 3:00 PM train from 
Bedford to the county seat of White Plains, seventeen miles 
south.  There, the two triumphant Whigs gossiped and caught 
up with their counterparts from Westchester‟s usually 
Democratic southern section.  Hearing of their friends‟ 
overwhelming victories surprised Robertson, leading him to 
exclaim, “The Whigs have carried almost everything!”  
Indeed, the Whigs had swept every elective office in 
Westchester County.
52
 
The demise of Robertson‟s party a few years later 
marked the end of America‟s Second Party System, 
characterized by Whig-Democratic competition between 1824 
                                                        
1William Robertson, “Diary of Judge William H. Robertson,” 
Vol. 3, Oct. 31 (first quotation), Nov. 7 (second quotation), 8 
(third quotation), 1848, Westchester County Historical 
Society, Elmsford, NY.  Robertson received with 2,246 votes 
(57%).  For election results, see Westchester Herald, “Official 
Canvass,” Nov. 24, 1848. 
28  
 
and 1860.  Scholars have extensively chronicled how and why 
this system rose and fell.  Yet historians have overlooked one 
important area of the American political landscape: the suburb. 
Despite the recent popularity of suburbs as a subject of 
twentieth century history, few historians have studied politics 
in nineteenth century American suburbs.  The most complete 
scholarly account of the county‟s history, a 1982 Ph.D 
dissertation, is a genealogical study that includes only scant 
analysis of voting behavior, political ideology, and party 
formation.  One political scientist‟s observation, over eighty 
years ago, that Westchester County was “the unexplored…area 
of American politics,” remains true to this day.  Mapping the 
collapse of the Second Party System in what is perhaps the 
most famous suburb in America sheds light on how the 
development of new communities in 1850s New York 
enflamed political controversies and why the parties of Andrew 
Jackson‟s era became extinct.53   
Historians continue to debate the causes of this 
political realignment. One prominent thesis is that the 
Democrats and Whigs disintegrated because the slavery 
extension issue fractured the American electorate along 
sectional instead of party lines. Another group of historians 
defend the so-called ethno-cultural interpretation, which posits 
that nativism, temperance, and religious conflict were the 
primary culprits in the death of the Second Party System. 
Though Westchesterites, like most other Americans, cared 
about slavery extension, it was primarily local ethno-cultural 
                                                        
53
 Paul M. Cuncannon, “The Proposed Charters for 
Westchester County, New York,” The American Political 
Science Review 22, no. 1 (Feb. 1928): 130; Kevin Kruse and 
Thomas Sugrue, The New Suburban History (Chicago, 2006); 
Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New 
American Right (Princeton, 2002); Becky Nicolaides, My Blue 
Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of 
Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago, 2002); Matthew 
Zuckerbraun, “Born to Rule: Aristocracy in New York Politics 
After Jackson, a Study of Westchester County, New York 
Families in Office, 1840-1910,” (Ph.D diss., Columbia 
University, 1982). 
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issues that motivated voters to abandon their old parties in 
response to the political crises of the early 1850s.  But as the 
Third Party System took form in the late 1850s, it was slavery 
that gave the Democrats and Republicans shape and 
substance.
54
 
Westchester is a revealing case study of the Second 
Party System because the county enjoyed robust commercial 
ties to New York City, the financial capital of the United States 
and a central political battleground during the transition to the 
Third Party System. The journey from the county seat of White 
Plains to the southern tip of Manhattan, the largest market in 
the U.S., was only thirty-five miles.  With the exception of 
New York and Kings Counties, Westchester had the largest 
merchant population in the state in the 1850s. As a county that 
was only beginning to transition from rural to suburban, 
however, the most common occupation for Westchesterites at 
the start of that decade remained farming.  Though the county 
contained only an average population of farmers, the aggregate 
value of Westchester‟s farmland in 1850 was the sixth highest 
of any county in the United States, and exceeded that of six 
entire states.  By the end of the decade, Westchester‟s farmland 
had appreciated to become the third most valuable of any 
county nationally.  As the 1850s dawned, the county was a 
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 On slavery extension as the impetus for political 
realignment, see John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and 
Politics in the Antebellum Republic, 2 vols. (New York, 
2007); Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (New 
York, 1970); and James L. Huston, Calculating the Value of 
the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic 
Origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003). On the 
ethno-cultural interpretation, see Ronald P. Formisano, The 
Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861 
(Princeton, 1971); William E. Gienapp, Origins of the 
Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York, 1987); and Joel H. 
Sibley, The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American 
Politics Before the Civil War (New York, 1985). 
30  
 
commercial and agricultural powerhouse in both state and 
nation.
55
 
These developments turned the county into an 
appealing place to call home.  Westchester‟s population grew 
by 70% during the 1850s, raising it from the forty-third most 
populous county in the United States in 1850 to twenty-first 
most populous in 1860.  Much of this growth was concentrated 
in the three towns adjacent to New York City in what is today 
the Bronx.  One satisfied commuter from Morrisania observed 
that by 1850, southern Westchester was a desirable “location as 
a place of residence, for persons doing business in the city, 
being so easy of access” to midtown and lower Manhattan.  
Even twenty miles to the north, a White Plains editor 
complained in 1853 that as a result of Westchester‟s 
attractiveness to disgruntled New Yorkers, “the city is pouring 
out an unbroken tide of population into our midst.”56 
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 Franklin B. Hough, Census of the State of New-York for 
1855 (Albany: Charles Van Benthuysen, 1857), 187 
(merchants), 313 (farmers); Charles E. Johnson, Proceedings 
of the Board of Supervisors of Westchester County (Yonkers, 
1860); for national statistics, see University of Virginia 
Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, Historical Census 
Browser, 
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus/ 
(accessed Nov. 24, 2009). 
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 Nicholas McGraw in Westchester Gazette, Sep. 20, 1850 
(first quotation); Eastern State Journal, Sep. 23, 1853 (second 
quotation); Rohit T. Aggarwala, "The Hudson River Railroad 
and the Development of Irvington, New York, 1849-1860" 
Hudson Valley Regional Review 10, no. 2, (Sep. 1993): 67; 
Evelyn Gonzalez, The Bronx, Columbia History of Urban Life 
(New York, 2004), 1-40; Ira Rosenwaike, Population History 
of New York City (Syracuse, 1972), 52; Edward K. Spann, The 
New Metropolis: New York City, 1840-1857 (New York, 
1981), 189-191.  In 1850, 58,263 people lived in Westchester. 
In 1860, 99,497 people lived in Westchester. For population 
statistics, see UVA, Historical Census Browser (accessed 
Nov. 24, 2009).  See Table 1 in the Appendix for details about 
the county newspapers cited in this study. 
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Political parties struggled to adapt to Westchester‟s 
changing demography over the course of the 1850s.  Local 
Whigs and Democrats were largely unable to address the new 
issues that arose during this turbulent decade. The new 
suburbanites were typically affluent Protestants who brought 
their anti-Catholic and pro-temperance proclivities with them, 
which inextricably altered Westchester‟s political landscape.  
Though the Democratic Party remained dominant in 
Westchester throughout the 1850s, this new constituency gave 
rise to political conflicts that determined election results, 
destroyed the Whig Party, divided the Democrats, gave rise to 
third parties, and reflected national sentiment on a variety of 
salient issues.  The major parties‟ failure to address important 
policy issues of the early 1850s led the editor of Westchester‟s 
most popular Democratic newspaper, the Eastern State 
Journal, to observe that “we are indeed upon „loose party 
times.‟”  But that same editor correctly predicted three years 
later, “out of this chaos, [new] parties will take form and 
shape.”  This chaos engulfed Westchester County, creating 
unusual political coalitions and realignments at all levels of 
government.
57
 
Perhaps the most notable theme that permeated 
Westchester‟s politics during the early 1850s was antipartyism.  
This sentiment flourished across the county, but was especially 
strong in the southern section that had absorbed most of the 
well-to-do migrants from New York City. Cogswell and Hyde 
refused to endorse a party ticket during the 1850 national and 
state contests, instead instructing southern Westchesterites to 
vote “without distinction of party” for a “Union Ticket” 
consisting mostly of Democrats and a few Whigs.
  
Even ten 
years prior to the Civil War, suburbanites generally felt a 
stronger allegiance to country than to party and expressed a 
willingness to shed their party ties for the sake of Union.  In the 
aftermath of the 1850 elections, predicted these editors, “new 
parties will be formed, or…the two great parties of this day will 
be reorganized.”  In the new villages adjacent to the City, 
“party spirit has not yet been allowed to interfere with local 
affairs…it is no matter whether a Judge, assessor, tax-gatherer, 
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Constable, &c. be Whig or Democrat,” declared the Gazette’s 
editors, in 1851.  In advance of the April local elections, 
Cogswell and Hyde supported candidates “without reference 
to…party politics” and encouraged their readers to “break loose 
from party trammels, and act an independent party.”  The 
electoral districts that bordered the City supported a so-called 
“Regular Dem. Whig” ticket that included a Democrat as town 
supervisor of West Farms and a Whig as town supervisor of 
Westchester. Though these two candidates were of different 
parties, they both won handily in nearly identical districts with 
similar constituencies. The electorate‟s weariness of party 
labels revealed that the new residents of Westchester County 
had weak local political allegiances years before the slavery-
extension crisis challenged the major national parties.
 58
 
Divisions within the parties posed just as much a 
threat to the Second Party System as did antipartyism.  At the 
1850 New York convention in Syracuse, for example, state and 
county Whigs divided into two groups: the Silver Grays and the 
Sewardites.  Silver Grays represented the party‟s conservative 
members, also known as Cotton Whigs, who bolted when the 
convention delegates incorporated into their platform William 
H. Seward‟s anti-slavery policies. This faction derived its name 
from the silver-white hair of Frances Granger, one of the 
leaders of the bolting faction.  Also led by Millard Fillmore, 
Silver Grays favored a conciliatory approach to southern 
slaveholders, strong temperance laws, and restricting 
immigrants and Catholics from civic life.
 
 Sewardites, known 
pejoratively as “Woolly Heads,” were “Conscience Whigs” 
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 Westchester was the name of both a town in the southern 
section of the county that is now the south Bronx and the 
name of the county itself. On local inter-party cooperation, see 
Gonzalez, The Bronx, 39. Quotations in this paragraph are 
arranged in chronological order, from Westchester Gazette, 
Oct. 18, 1850, Mar. 21, 28, Oct. 31, 1851. For election results, 
see Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors of Westchester 
County, “Official Canvass,” (Yonkers, 1850); New York 
Times, Nov. 7, 1851; and Proceedings of the Board of 
Supervisors of Westchester County, “Official Canvass,” 
(Yonkers, 1851). 
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who opposed the Compromise of 1850, favored restricting the 
spread of slavery, and were generally indifferent toward 
foreign influence in domestic politics. This faction derived its 
name from a prevalent racial slur against blacks because of the 
faction‟s anti-slavery political views.  Though Sewardites 
dominated statewide, the county was evenly split between them 
and Silver Grays: each Whig faction had a paper in the county 
and half of Westchester‟s delegates joined Granger‟s protest.59   
These factions developed in the county along sectional 
lines. The Whiggish northern area contained commercial 
farmers, businessmen, and industrial interests who embraced 
the political views of Seward, Horace Greeley, and Thurlow 
Weed.  The southern section contained ex-New Yorkers who 
hated Catholics, enjoyed commercial relationships with 
southern planters, and were generally evangelicals.  In addition, 
clusters of French Huguenot refugees had long inhabited the 
southern Westchester communities of Pelham and New 
Rochelle, forming another crucible in which anti-Catholic 
sentiment flourished.  Though the Silver Grays and Sewardites 
were ideologically opposed on slavery, when it came to local 
affairs, said a Democratic editor, they “lovingly embrace each 
other, and…make no distinctions between their own candidates 
of whatever faction.” In the early 1850s, faction leaders horse-
traded by splitting local nominations.  But as nativism and 
slavery destroyed their national and state parties, Westchester 
Whigs followed their factional leaders into new political parties 
that upended the local and national party systems.
60
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Divisions within the Democratic Party also influenced 
party realignments, though these factional disputes were fueled 
by slavery and financial policy.  The more radical faction, 
called the Barnburners, favored the Wilmot Proviso to exclude 
slavery from all new western territories and opposed expanding 
the public debt to finance the Erie Canal. This faction derived 
its name from a farmer who burned down his barn to drive out 
rats. In New York, Barnburners were willing to destroy public 
works and the banks that funded them to root out waste and 
fraud. Led by Martin Van Buren, the Barnburners bolted from 
the Democratic Party in the 1848 presidential election to 
support the Free Soil Party—a coalition of Barnburner 
Democrats, abolitionists, and supporters of Henry Clay who 
fled the Whigs after they nominated Zachary Taylor for 
President.  The conservatives, known as Hunkers, opposed the 
Wilmot Proviso, supported reconciliation with their southern 
slaveholding counterparts, and supported the Whig policy of 
borrowing money to pay for canal improvements. Members of 
this faction were loyal to William L. Marcy, an ex-governor, 
senator, and cabinet secretary, and derived their name by 
“hunkering” after the spoils of office. Westchester sent a 
Hunker, Benjamin Brandreth, to Albany as state senator while 
the Democratic Party was split in two.
61
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 On the Barnburners, see Peekskill Republican, June 6, 1848; 
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Mixed reaction to the Compromise of 1850 within and 
between the major parties foreshadowed party fragmentation 
and realignment.  The parties were in the midst of such a crisis 
that a month after the Compromise passed, the Democratic 
press predicted, in November 1850, that “the two old 
parties…will entirely break up before the next Presidential 
election” in 1852.  Sutherland‟s prediction was incorrect, but 
his forecast had some convincing evidence: a Silver Gray Whig 
President had signed the legislation, which passed Congress 
with the support of Democrats whose views aligned with the 
Hunkers; Sewardite Whigs and Free Soil Democrats opposed 
the bills.  The unusual coalitions that supported and opposed 
the Compromise nationally also existed in Westchester.  The 
Silver Gray and Hunker presses predictably observed that “all 
party feelings and party politics seemed merged” after a 
meeting of pro-Compromise Westchesterites passed a set of 
bipartisan resolutions supporting the controversial Fugitive 
Slave Law but repudiating secession. The Sewardites, of 
course, decried the Law as “inhuman and revolting,” criticizing 
the Compromise for “forcing us back into bondage and 
servitude.”  Westchester‟s leading Barnburner editor, of course, 
also considered this piece of the Omnibus Bill “a most gross 
usurpation of power by Congress; a plan, palpable violation of 
the Constitution.”  Party affiliation, then, was not a reliable 
indicator of a voter‟s views on slavery: Hunker Democrats and 
Silver Gray Whigs favored compromise with the South, 
whereas Barnburner Democrats and Woolly Head Whigs 
sought to restrict slavery‟s spread.  The evaporation of 
differences between local parties when it came to national 
policy had grave consequences for the Second American Party 
system.  “Consensus, not conflict,” according to one historian, 
destroyed the Jacksonian parties.  Without clear differences 
between Whig and Democratic policies, voters shed their old 
political affiliations.
62
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The other major source of disagreement between the 
Barnburner and Hunker Democrats, and Silver Grays and 
Sewardite Whigs, concerned how to finance Erie Canal 
improvements.  In the age of Andrew Jackson, the parties split 
cleanly on this issue: Democrats resisted government 
sponsorship of internal improvements, whereas Whigs favored 
them.  But according to one historian, in the 1850 and 1851 
statewide contests the canal question surpassed even slavery as 
a divisive force in the extant party system. The unusual 
alignment of the parties on this question, with the conservative 
factions proposing to use projected toll revenues as collateral 
for a loan and the radical factions proposing a direct tax on 
canal shipments, confirmed Sutherland‟s view that “the Canal 
question is…above party.”  Westchester became embroiled in 
this controversy when its state senator, Hunker Benjamin 
Brandreth, broke with the state party over canal funding.  After 
Whigs forced a vote on a bill to borrow $9 million to finance 
improvements, twelve Democratic senators walked out of the 
chamber.  The state senate became paralyzed as it lacked the 
necessary three-fifths attendance required for a quorum. 
Though Brandreth did not support the bill, he was one of two 
Democratic senators who remained in the chamber to vote nay.  
“It appeared to me contrary to the spirit of Republicanism,” 
Brandreth observed in October 1851, to block a vote.  Few 
Westchester Democrats supported Brandreth‟s decision, or 
shared his fear that the bolters would further weaken their 
already divided party at the polls.
63
   
This clash between Brandreth and his party leadership 
reflected how local concerns accelerated the crumbling of the 
Second Party System.  Westchester‟s Barnburner press, which 
opposed Brandreth because he was a Hunker, “wanted no new 
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issue….the party would probably be better off if the contending 
leaders of both the late sections of the party were overthrown.”  
The Hunker press, which generally supported the senator, 
endorsed the bolting senators and correctly pointed out that 
“the Democracy do not appear to be united in this 
movement…with such disunion in the Democratic ranks,” there 
was no such thing as a “majority opinion of the Democracy of 
this county.” Brandreth‟s decision to buck the state party 
reveals that even the most prominent Westchester politician 
shared his constituents‟ antiparty sentiment.  Brandreth paid a 
steep cost for contravening his leadership: the party denied him 
re-nomination in 1851, and he was trounced at the polls 
running as an independent candidate.  The near unanimous 
condemnation of the bolting Democrats, coupled with editors‟ 
rhetorical support for ousting party leaders, would remain a 
driving force behind the demise of the Second Party System in 
Westchester.
64
 
If political affiliation did not reflect voters‟ views on 
extending slavery and expanding the Erie Canal, party ties were 
an even more unlikely indicator of Westchester politicians‟ 
views on temperance.  Former Whigs in Cortlandt, a town on 
the county‟s northern border, believed that curtailing 
drunkenness represented “a crisis in which the principles of the 
two leading parties are not involved.”  These temperance 
advocates encouraged fellow Westchesterites, during the local 
elections in spring 1851, to support an independent slate of 
anti-liquor politicians “without reference to creed or party.”  
The temperance ticket posed such a threat to the major parties 
that Thomas A. Whitney, the Democratic candidate for 
Cortlandt Town Supervisor, withdrew two weeks before the 
race and supported his Whig opponent.  Most of these local 
contests in the twenty-two municipalities across the county, 
according to Sutherland, were “waged on other than party 
grounds…the issue was rum or no rum.”  The orientation of 
Westchester‟s electorate as either pro-temperance or anti-
temperance, instead of Democratic or Whig, indicated that the 
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process of party realignment was not solely connected to 
national debates about slavery.  Rather, the breaking up of the 
Second Party System was deeply rooted in local affairs that 
affected daily life, and was catalyzed when the two major 
parties failed to address ethno-cultural issues plaguing northern 
communities. According to a Hunker editor, Westchester voted 
“without regard to strict party lines” in 1851.65 
In the southern section of the county as well, the 
prevalence of ethno-cultural issues led commuters to drift from 
their old parties.  During the 1852 election, hundreds of West 
Farms Protestants coalesced around an antiparty prohibitionist 
ticket.  Though this slate was narrowly defeated, the Eastern 
State Journal observed, “the contest was not a party one; it was 
between the…Maine Liquor Law [Temperance] advocates on 
the one side and the opponents of the Law on the other.”  Many 
of these commuters, like their northern counterparts, held 
stronger allegiances to the temperance movement than they did 
to political parties.  “It is a glorious thing that party ties begin 
to hang loosely on the people, and that considerations other 
than party interests are beginning to…call out the votes of our 
citizens,” reported an anonymous temperance advocate in the 
Peekskill Republican.  He wanted elected officials to close 
taverns on Sundays, create strict requirements for obtaining a 
liquor license, and require any establishment that served 
alcohol to also provide housing.  Neither the Democrats nor the 
Whigs incorporated these demands into their platforms, causing 
many voters to flee from their ranks, weakening their own 
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electoral strength, and foreshadowing the rise of new parties 
that did address issues about which commuters cared.
66
 
The salience of the temperance issue, and the Whigs‟ 
inability to address it, accelerated the party‟s disintegration. In 
the 1852 election, the Westchester County Temperance 
Alliance held a convention to nominate candidates for 
statewide office.  The first ballot for state assemblyman of the 
county‟s northern district was evenly divided between John 
Collett, a Whig, and George Mason, a Democrat.  Collett 
ultimately won the Alliance nomination and spoiled the 
election for the Whig candidate: though the Whigs typically 
won this seat comfortably, they lost to the Democrats by 39 
votes out of 4,266. “If the Whigs had nominated a Maine Law 
Candidate in this District…he would have been elected,” 
lamented J.J. Chambers, the Sewardite editor of the Peekskill 
Republican, a few days after the election.  Comparing the split 
between the Whig and Temperance Parties to “a big Railroad 
accident,” a Silver Gray likewise observed in the Hudson River 
Chronicle that Whigs who defected to the Alliance “find 
themselves and the Temperance cause crushed…[Collett] will 
feel that he has injured his own party.”  By 1852, temperance 
movements had siphoned thousands of voters from the Whig 
Party, which was well on its way to extinction.
67
 
The debate over temperance intensified in the spring 
of 1853 when Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour vetoed a 
prohibitory liquor law.  In response, the antiparty County 
Temperance Alliance passed resolutions to consider 
nominating any Democrat or Whig for state office who 
supported the Maine Law. Though Horace Greeley was the 
group‟s choice for state senate, he declined the nomination.  
The convention instead selected William Robertson, the Whig 
attorney from Bedford, as their candidate.  Robertson‟s original 
party was still reeling from its 1852 defeat, and so to avoid past 
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mistakes, the Whigs also nominated him.  Perhaps party leaders 
were swayed to support the temperance candidate upon hearing 
Samuel Wood, a powerful Alliance organizer, declare that “it 
were better…that existing political parties were annihilated, 
than that the evils [of liquor] we complain of should be 
perpetuated.” County Whigs had no choice but to take Wood 
seriously and cooperate with his anti-liquor party.  This 
marriage proved fruitful: on Election Day, the fusion ticket 
picked up both a state senate seat and an assembly seat from 
the Democrats.  Reflecting on the temperance organization‟s 
recent victory, one of Wood‟s colleagues, D.D. McLaughlin, 
boasted that they “held the balance of power, and could thus by 
firm and united action control any election.”  Westchester 
Whigs‟ experience with the temperance movement was a 
microcosm of a national trend that intensified in 1853 and left 
their party feeble and fragmented.  Across the north and mid-
Atlantic, voters expressed anti-liquor sentiment not through 
their traditional parties, but through state and local temperance 
organizations. By contributing to the destruction of the Whig 
Party, the Maine Law movement turned the 1850s into an era 
of realignment.
68
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Westchester‟s Democratic Party pounced on the 
fusion of Whigs and the Temperance Alliance in a desperate 
attempt to woo anti-liquor Democrats back into the party‟s 
fold.  Attrition from the Democrats began in 1852 when 
temperance forces came close to installing one of their own as 
Democratic candidate for state assembly in Westchester‟s 
northern district.  With the prohibitionist threat to Democratic 
Party strength fresh in mind, the Eastern State Journal noted 
the “divided and confused condition of the Democratic party on 
the one side, and the rotten, crumbling state of the Whig party 
on the other, together with the „loose party times‟ prevalent in 
every quarter” of the county.  These three phenomena, 
continued the editorial, “gave to the Maine Law organization, 
or „Alliance,‟ a potency and effectiveness at the [1853] election 
just passed, which no clear-sighted sagacious politician could 
have failed to foresee.”  The county‟s other Democratic paper, 
the Westchester Herald, endorsed the Maine Law a month 
before that election.  Ambivalent Democrats now had political 
cover to vote the Temperance ticket, confirming the Eastern 
State Journal’s fears.  By providing a political vehicle for anti-
liquor advocates, the temperance party enticed voters to 
abandon the Democrats, and, of course, the Whigs.  Flight from 
the major parties, in turn, led to the unraveling of the 
institutions that sustained the Second Party System.
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As the relative stability ushered in by the Compromise 
of 1850 gave way to turbulence by the end of the 1853, yet 
another split emerged in the Democratic Party that facilitated 
political realignment.  Many Barnburners found themselves 
without a major party affiliation after the disappearance of the 
anti-slavery Free Soil Party in 1849.  Westchester Hunkers, 
however, needed Barnburner votes in advance of the 1852 
Presidential contest.  But many Hunkers believed so strongly in 
supporting Southern slavery policy that they refused to 
reconcile their differences with the Barnburners.  This dispute 
cut a deep divide within the Hunker camp between Softs, who 
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would welcome Barnburner bolters back into the party, and the 
Hards, who would penalize them.  In 1853, Westchester 
Democrats generally supported the Hards because Softs in 
Albany had temporarily fused with the Whigs in support of 
temperance candidates.  A week after this unusual coalition of 
Softs and Whigs won a few state and local offices, the county‟s 
Hard press decried “these traitors to the cause of Democracy,” 
who “have led off a portion of the honest masses from us, and 
defeated our candidates.”  Stung losing by an important state 
senate seat, Westchester‟s leading Barnburner, Edmund 
Sutherland, attributed his party‟s 1853 statewide defeat to “the 
Temperance Alliance…but Free Soil treachery and bolting did 
more.”  The division between the Hards and Softs continued to 
plague Westchester Democrats throughout the mid-1850s, 
ultimately contributing to the party‟s only two electoral losses 
in the county during that decade.
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The tumult of 1853 intensified the following year 
when Stephen Douglas‟s Kansas-Nebraska Act pushed slavery 
to the forefront of national, state, and local politics.  In 
Westchester, both Democrats and Whigs sought to exploit anti-
Nebraska sentiment to win elections.  The Sewardite press 
made the most vocal appeal to anti-slavery advocates by 
decrying the bill‟s passage as “the darkest day in the Senate” 
and promising “political death to every man who lifted his hand 
or voice in favor of slavery.”  The largest of many anti-
Nebraska meetings in the county took place at the White Plains 
Courthouse in August 1854, and featured speeches by 
politicians from both parties.  The county‟s Barnburner organ, 
the Eastern State Journal, also commended Westchester‟s 
Democratic Congressman, Jared V. Peck, for voting against the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Sewardites and Barnburners united in 
opposition.  Westchester‟s Hards, however, split.  Most 
prominent among them, State Senator Benjamin Brandreth 
encouraged his supporters to remain “true to [their] northern 
instincts and experience” by opposing the Kansas-Nebraska 
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Act.  But Caleb Roscoe, the editor of the Westchester Herald, 
supported Douglas‟s bill because it established the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, or local referenda on whether or not to 
permit slavery in the territories.  Despite this minor division 
within an already factionalized Democratic Party, anti-slavery 
sentiment generally united Westchesterites.  Whereas reaction 
to the Compromise of 1850 was mixed, reaction to the Kansas-
Nebraska Act was nearly unanimous.  So although slavery 
became a salient national issue, fault lines between the local 
parties formed based on ethno-cultural distinctions.  In the 
1854 contest, nativism and temperance did more than slavery to 
upend Westchester‟s party system.71 
Across the North, voters expressed nativist sentiment 
through a third party called the Know-Nothings.  The rank-and-
file often belonged to secret fraternal lodges affiliated with the 
Order of United Americans (O.U.A.) or the Order of the Star 
Spangled Banner (O.S.S.B).  According to a county Know-
Nothing, these lodges consisted mostly of former Hunkers and 
Silver Grays, who coalesced around a conservative political 
agenda of prohibiting alcohol, creating tough naturalization 
laws, and limiting Catholic influence in public institutions.  In 
the southern towns of West Farms, Pelham, and Westchester, 
anti-Catholic, anti-liquor, and antiparty sentiment had 
flourished since at least 1850, providing a rich pool of voters 
for the Know-Nothings. “They seem, down in the lower part of 
the County, to deal in Native Americanism,” charged a 
Peekskill Whig who lived on Westchester‟s northern border. 
This sentiment was, in reality, ubiquitous in the anti-Catholic 
and temperance enclaves along Westchester‟s New York City 
border.  Commuters who fled the City, in part to avoid Irish 
immigrants, found a home in the Know-Nothing Party.  
Likewise, the Huguenot Protestants, who fled persecution from 
a French Catholic monarchy to settle in Pelham and New 
                                                        
71
 Peekskill Republican, Mar. 7, 1854 (first quotation); Eastern 
State Journal, Aug. 11, 1854 (second quotation). Address of 
Benjamin Brandreth” in Peekskill Republican, Mar. 7, Oct. 3, 
1854; Westchester Herald, Feb. 14, 1854; Michael Kirn, Jr., 
“Voters, Parties, and Legislative Politics in New York State, 
1846-1876,” (Ph.D diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 488. 
44  
 
Rochelle, also flocked to the Know-Nothings.  Many voters in 
West Farms, according to a Peekskill Republican correspondent 
feared the “foreign and antagonistic population” a few miles 
south, whose “noisy and riotous proceedings” disturbed 
otherwise tranquil country lives.  By providing a vehicle to 
elevate the ethno-cultural issues that neither the Democrats nor 
the Whigs adequately addressed, the Know-Nothings weakened 
these two factionalized parties and dominated Westchester 
politics in 1854 and 1855.
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Though Know-Nothingism thrived in Westchester, 
some lodges suffered from factional rivalries.  These divisions 
stemmed primarily from previous party affiliations and 
prevented the Order from establishing itself as a potent political 
force as the Third Party System took form. “I have tried for the 
last six or eight meetings to procure an acceptance and 
indorsement of this ticket,” complained an Ossining Know-
Nothing to party leader and 1854 gubernatorial candidate 
Daniel Ullmann.  A week before the election, Know-Nothing 
cohesion appeared to be unraveling in that town because “two 
thirds of this council will vote directly for Seymour, and the 
Whig members insist that a State nomination by our Order is 
intended to entice the Whig members to throw away their votes 
on our nominee.”  This worst-case scenario became a reality 
when Ullmann was routed in Ossining, with the Soft candidate 
and the Whig candidate receiving a combined 80% of the vote.  
An Ossining Democrat mocked this lodge, in an Eastern State 
Journal column, as being “led by a set of old party hacks and 
broken down politicians who have managed to crawl into their 
Order.”  Alexander H. Wells, the leader of O.S.S.B Chapter 
#72 in Ossining, conceded that his fellow nativists would most 
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likely vote “with their previous party predilections.”  Though 
his concern proved valid for his lodge, most others around the 
county supported Ullmann.
 
 O.S.S B members shed their old 
party ties and united with previous political rivals to vote the 
Know-Nothing ticket in the fall of 1854.  J.P. Sanders, a 
Peekskill Know-Nothing who assured Ullmann that 
“everything is smooth in this section,” better measured the 
Westchester electorate‟s pulse than did his Ossining 
counterpart.
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Both parties feared the Order as the 1854 elections 
approached. “Every vote given to Ullmann [Know-Nothing] 
will be taken from Clark [Whig] and practically given to 
Seymour [Democrat], the Rum candidate and advocate of 
slavery propagandism. Why then should any Whig or 
Temperance man…worse than waste his vote, by casting it for 
this altogether useless nomination?” inquired the county‟s 
Whig organ in advance of the gubernatorial election.  Though 
Clark narrowly edged Seymour to capture the governorship, 
Ullmann likely siphoned hundreds of Westchester voters from 
his Whig opponent, almost leading to a Democratic victory.
74
  
But the Democrats surprisingly had more to fear from the rise 
of the nativist party. As the election returns demonstrate, from 
1853 to 1854, Democrats‟ share of the vote was slashed by 
25%, whereas the Whig share of the vote declined by 13%, 
which equaled the Know-Nothings‟ 38%.  “From the number 
of Know Nothings, it will be a task of much difficulty to elect a 
Democrat from Westchester to Congress,” Eastern State 
Journal editor Edmund Sutherland predicted, after observing 
large defections from his party.  His fears were valid.  At the 
1854 canvass, the Know-Nothing ticket polled pluralities in a 
majority of Westchester municipalities.  Westchester‟s 
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Congressman, Bayard Clarke, was now a loyal member of the 
Order, as were most countywide officials.
75
 
By 1854, party lines had become dismantled and 
traditional political apparatuses were rendered impotent. “A 
perfect whirlwind seems to have passed over the county, 
rooting up and tearing down all previous political calculations, 
electing those in many instances least expecting to be elected,” 
wrote Sutherland.  This editor astutely observed that “from out 
of the political chaos” of divided Whigs and Democrats, “the 
Nativist element, with its secret and close organization called 
„Know Nothing,‟ sprung up, absorbing materials of every 
description of opinion and character.”  Westchester Whigs 
boasted that the Democratic Party had become “a house 
divided against itself” because temperance and slavery 
overshadowed party lines.  Adding the secret political 
organization of Know-Nothings into this political stew even 
further clouded the electoral landscape. The large number of 
parties, and the myriad of diverse issues at stake, represented 
that the stability created by two-party competition during the 
Second Party System had given way to chaos by the mid-
1850s.  After the 1854 election, yet another threat to the 
Jacksonian political system emerged in the form of a new 
party.
76
  
As anti-slavery sentiment intensified, it cleaved 
existing fissures in the Whig Party and led to its complete 
disintegration.  The major turning point came in May 1854, 
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when Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act along 
sectional, instead of party, lines.  Sewardites, Barnburners, and 
a few Softs who also opposed the act, joined with anti-liquor 
politicos to found the Westchester Republican Party in 1855.  
“Let all party differences be thrown to the winds,” proclaimed 
a Whig-turned-Republican editor, who welcomed anyone 
“whether hitherto known as a Democrat or Whig.”  Meeting at 
the spot in White Plains where the Provincial Congress of New 
York had received the Declaration of Independence, the men at 
the first County Republican Convention “disregarded their 
former party associations by uniting” on a platform dominated 
by anti-slavery policy. Specifically, Westchester Republicans 
repudiated the influence of the Slave Power, opposed repeal of 
the Missouri Compromise, and decried the fighting between 
pro- and anti-slavery forces in the Kansas territory.  Like the 
handful of other northern suburban counties around New York 
City, Boston, and Philadelphia, Westchester embraced a 
moderate brand of Republicanism.  The federal government 
lacked the authority to meddle in states‟ affairs, the 
Westchester platform contended, and thus could not abolish 
slavery in the states where it already existed.  Rather, the 
institution should die gradually by excluding slavery from 
western territories and rejecting admission of additional slave 
states.  The local 1855 platform almost exactly mirrored the 
first national Republican one in 1856, which one historian 
considers the handiwork of the party‟s moderate wing.77   
Though free labor dominated Republican ideology, 
the party in Westchester also organized to counter Know-
Nothingism.  The county platform contained a unique plank 
explicitly “repudiat[ing] the order of Know-Nothings.”  Party 
leaders considered Know-Nothings more threatening than 
Democrats.  In the first election the local Republicans 
contested, they joined with Democrats to create an Anti-Know-
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Nothing Union County ticket “in opposition to the apostates 
and renegades from all parties who have banded themselves 
together in an oath-bound secret conspiracy.” Though New 
Yorkers could choose from four statewide tickets in 1855, the 
Hard Westchester Herald analyzed, “the local contest lies 
between the secret unprincipled, and prospective order of 
Know Nothings, and the PEOPLE without distinction as to the 
former party ties.”  The anti-Know-Nothing state senate 
candidate, Benjamin Brandreth, published an editorial in 
several Westchester papers declaring that, “the contest in this 
campaign is not between Democrats and Republicans, but 
between patriots and Know-Nothings.”  Brandreth‟s appeal to 
patriotic principles, in addition to his anti-slavery credentials, 
mollified reluctant Republicans loath to support Democrats.  
Opposing Know-Nothingism superseded party lines in 
Westchester.  According to the Eastern State Journal, “the 
Whigs are ready to sustain Dr. Brandreth in this contest—not 
because he is a Whig, for he is not…but to defeat the Know-
Nothing[s].”78 
  Though Westchester Know-Nothings consisted 
primarily of ex-Democrats, they nonetheless enthusiastically 
supported an ex-Whig for state senator.  Their nominee, John 
W. Ferdon, typified northern Know-Nothingism by supporting 
the Maine Law and opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  But 
Ferdon appealed to ex-Democrats primarily because he 
opposed William H. Seward.  As state senator in the 1840s, 
Ferdon had supported Ogden Hoffman, a Democrat-turned-
Whig, over Seward for U.S. Senate because the nativist 
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opposed Seward‟s plan to create publicly funded schools for 
Catholic children.  Schooling again played a critical role in the 
1855 election, and was perhaps the clearest policy distinction 
between Ferdon and Brandreth.  The Democrat had long 
supported Seward‟s policy.  Brandreth‟s status as an English 
immigrant, moreover, enraged county Know-Nothings who 
favored extending the naturalization period to twenty-one 
years.  Such a policy would have forced Brandreth to wait one 
more year before earning citizenship, precluding him from 
even running for office.  Because both candidates opposed the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, national issues were minimized in the 
1855 contest.  Ethno-cultural issues figured most prominently.  
On the one side, an ex-Whig Know-Nothing supported 
embraced nativism and temperance.  On the other, an ex-
Democrat “Unionist” rejected them.79 
This strategy had mixed results. In the state senate 
race, Brandreth narrowly carried Westchester, but in the 
district, which also comprised Putnam and Rockland counties, 
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing, won by a mere 62 votes out of 
11,116 cast.  Nevertheless, the anti-Know Nothing ticket won 
both assembly seats and a host of local offices.  The impressive 
Republican showing indicated that the new party united the 
political forces that had paralyzed Westchester Whigs.  The 
opportunity to converge with anti-slavery and temperance men 
in a new political party opposed to Democrats and Know-
Nothings proved attractive to Sewardite Whigs, who shed their 
old party label.
80
  This temporary coalition of Republicans, ex-
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Whigs, and Democrats sufficiently routed Know-Nothings in 
local contests for coroner, surrogate, superintendent of the 
poor, and county treasurer, among others.  Joel T. Headley, 
who headed the American ticket as nominee for secretary of 
state, polled a plurality in Westchester, and the Know-Nothing 
ticket polled pluralities statewide.  Still hopelessly divided into 
Softs and Hards, the Democratic Party was too crippled to 
seriously contend for elective office.  In Westchester, the party 
system that dominated since Jackson‟s presidency was now 
dead.
81
 
The Democrats remained factionalized heading into 
the 1856 presidential elections. The party‟s leading organ 
attacked party leaders.  “Setting aside both factitious 
organizations now existing…which divide the ranks and break 
down the energies of the party,” Sutherland suggested that the 
decades-old organization “start anew.”  Such antiparty 
expressions a few months prior to the presidential election 
seemed to foreshadow a weak performance at the polls.  Fierce 
inter-party competition in the immediate wake of the Second 
Party System‟s collapse also complicated Democratic efforts 
on two fronts: dissolving the 1855 fusion with Republicans and 
defeating Know-Nothingism.  Engulfed by antipartyism, 
nativism, and slavery, Westchester became a bloody 
battleground during the 1856 presidential campaign.
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Westchester Know-Nothings met with mixed 
emotions Millard Fillmore‟s 1856 nomination for president on 
the American Party ticket.  “There is a strong feeling here 
favorable to the American candidates,” Alexander Wells and 
Abram Hyatt, prominent Ossining Know-Nothings, wrote 
Daniel Ullmann.  “We have plenty of votes.”  Wells and Hyatt 
supported Fillmore because they shared Whig antecedents.  But 
among Democrats who dabbled in Know-Nothingism, 
Fillmore‟s nomination was not acceptable.  “What Democrat, 
who wishes well to his country, can vote for Fillmore?” asked a 
Hard who sympathized with the Know-Nothings.  “None 
surely,” he answered, because a victorious Fillmore would dole 
out patronage only to former Whigs.  Paralyzed by internal 
disputes between ex-Democrats and ex-Whigs, Know-Nothings 
became crippled and would never again seriously contend for 
elective office.
83
  
If even Westchester Know-Nothings could not fully 
shed their old party affiliations, then the American Party lacked 
the cohesion required to wage a winning national campaign for 
the presidency.  Fillmore‟s candidacy confronted ex-Whigs 
with a dilemma regarding slavery.  As President he had signed 
the controversial Compromise of 1850, which precipitated the 
New York Whigs‟ split into Sewardites and Silver Grays.  
Fillmore had led the conservative faction and still favored 
conciliation with southern slave interests, a position which, by 
1856, had become anathema to northern voters. Violent 
conflicts over whether to allow slavery in the Kansas territory, 
which came to a head in the months prior to the campaign, 
persuaded anti-slavery Know-Nothings to cast their lot with the 
Republican candidate, John Fremont, who ran on a free labor 
platform.  The election results indeed suggest that voters who 
bolted from the Know-Nothings after 1855 migrated almost 
entirely into the Republican fold.  These mass defections 
occurred because nativism was “made secondary to the 
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question of Slavery,” analyzed an American Party voter.  
Amidst this confusion among anti-slavery forces, the 
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan, squeezed out a close 
victory in county and a landslide in country.
84
   
Little did Buchanan know that Westchesterites 
ironically elected a Congressman who would become a sharp 
thorn in his side.  In 1856, New York‟s Ninth Electoral District, 
comprised of Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties, 
sent Democrat John B. Haskin to Washington.  Born in 1821 
into a family of New York shipping magnates, Haskin was 
raised in Fordham on an estate that is now part of Woodlawn 
Cemetery in the Bronx.  After studying law, Haskin became 
involved in Democratic politics when the political crisis of the 
1850s commenced.  As a conservative Hunker Democrat, he 
resisted agitating the slavery question by refusing to take a 
position on the Compromise on 1850 and by supporting the 
Baltimore Platform of 1852, which affirmed the local character 
of that divisive issue.  He also staunchly opposed the Maine 
Law and was elected to four consecutive terms as Town 
Supervisor of West Farms, beginning in 1850, before the influx 
of Protestant immigrants from New York City turned the 
southern towns into prohibitionist enclaves.  When it came to 
state politics, Haskin opposed the $9 million bill to finance Erie 
Canal improvements and considered his fellow Democrat, 
Benjamin Brandreth, a foe for refusing to bolt the Assembly in 
protest.  By 1854, national events forced Haskin to take a stand 
regarding slavery, so he supported Stephen Douglas‟ Kansas-
Nebraska Bill repealing the Missouri Compromise and 
endorsing popular sovereignty.  Now in Congress, Haskin was 
                                                        
84
 Hudson River Chronicle, Dec. 8, 1857 (quotation); Gunja 
Sengupta, For God and Mammon: Evangelicals, 
Entrepreneurs, Masters and Slaves in Territorial Kansas, 
1854-1860 (Athens, GA, 1996), 132.  The New York State 
Democrats had reconciled their differences in 1856 to present 
a single united ticket for the presidential election.  For election 
results, see Table 4 in the Appendix; Board of Supervisors, 
“Official Canvass,” 1855; New York Times, Nov. 25, 1856. 
53  
 
well positioned to take a pre-eminent role in the national 
debates regarding the extension of slavery.
85
 
Though slavery consumed national politics after the 
election of 1856, in Westchester ethno-cultural issues remained 
pre-eminent.  Fillmore‟s poor showing made it clear that 
Know-Nothings would soon cease to exist.  And with local 
elections in April and November 1857 quickly approaching, 
Republicans sought to envelop the key swing voting bloc—
American Party voters.  First, leaders re-nominated John 
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing incumbent, for state senate, even 
though the Republican rank-and-file had opposed his candidacy 
in 1855.  Second, the Republican-controlled state legislature 
passed the Metropolitan Police Bill, which unified the police 
departments of the City and several downstate counties, 
including Westchester.  In West Farms, Westchester, Pelham, 
and Morrisania, Know-Nothings and Republicans alike 
supported the bill based on their preference for law and order. 
These areas‟ proximity to the City “exposed [them] to the 
attacks of unscrupulous marauders,” most of whom, Rowe 
charged, were immigrants. “We have come to resemble the city 
in our moral as well as our physical character,” he decried.  As 
early as 1853, Edward Wells, the county District Attorney, 
acknowledged that these southern towns along the Harlem 
Railroad were disproportionately plagued by crime committed 
by New Yorkers.  Ferdon‟s vote in favor of the bill as state 
senator encouraged Republicans to believe that nativists would 
consider ethno-cultural issues at the ballot box and migrate into 
their camp.
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Democrats, in response, waged a vicious campaign 
against Republican positions on the Police Bill, slavery, and 
nativism.  They vilified Ferdon for voting with the Republicans 
to consolidate downstate police forces, which, they warned, 
would result in Westchester‟s occupation—similar to the 
British occupation of the colonies.  To make matters worse, 
county taxes would increase.  Describing the “Black 
Republican Party” as the refuge of aristocratic elites, the 
Eastern State Journal charged that, according to party creed, 
the government was “the omnipotent source of power, above 
the people, instituted to control and manage them.”  The 
Democratic editor applied this philosophy to both slavery and 
temperance.  Denying Kansas popular sovereignty would turn 
territorial residents into subjects of a monarchy in Washington, 
while legislating morality turned government into a guardian 
authority.  Westchesterites, according to the Sutherland, could 
either support Brandreth who thought “poor white people are as 
good as Niggers,” or support Ferdon who was allegedly in 
favor of black suffrage.  As Know-Nothingism waned, the 
Democrats and Republicans took opposing positions on a host 
of national and local issues.  If consensus destroyed the Second 
Party System, conflict was fast constructing the Third.
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In the battle for the remnants of Westchester‟s 
American Party, the Democrats bested the Republicans.  Little 
consensus exists on what caused this peculiar realignment.  A 
Republican blamed his party‟s 1857 defeat on “the general 
combination of the American with the Democratic Party.”  Low 
turnout because of the off-year election compounded the 
Republicans‟ woes.  Sutherland correctly pointed out that 
Democrats who had become Americans would switch back in 
1857. Both Sutherland and contemporary historians have 
pointed out that these voters had become fed up with the 
nativists‟ impasse over slavery.  Other historians have stressed 
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opposition to the Police Bill as the major 1857 election 
determinant.  The results for state senate seem to support this 
conclusion.  Though Ferdon polled better than the Republican 
Party generally, he lost even in municipalities bordering New 
York City that had the most vested interests in the Police Bill.  
By 1857, most residents in these southern towns were migrants 
from the City who still held strong allegiances to the 
Democratic machine at Tammany Hall, which opposed ceding 
control of the police force.  Whereas most historians agree that 
northern Know-Nothings generally migrated into the 
Republican camp, in Westchester it appears that local issues 
pushed them in droves towards the Democratic Party.
88
 
Know-Nothings who flocked there would soon 
discover that factional divisions regarding slavery once again 
plagued their party.  After disputes between pro-slavery and 
anti-slavery settlers in Kansas erupted in violence, the official 
territorial legislature met at Lecompton in 1857.  There, they 
passed a constitution allowing slavery and put the document to 
the territorial inhabitants for an up-or-down vote, which anti-
slavery forces boycotted.  Amid this uproar, President 
Buchanan endorsed the Lecompton Constitution. Democrats 
splintered about whether to follow his lead.  Senator Stephen 
A. Douglas of Illinois led a faction in opposition to the 
administration.  They criticized the Lecompton Constitution 
because the circumstances surrounding its passage seemed to 
contravene the principle of popular sovereignty.  Westchester‟s 
Congressman, John Haskin, was one of twelve House 
Democrats to cast his lot with Douglas, and against Buchanan.   
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On a stifling evening in June 1858, Haskin rose to 
address a crowd of 250 supporters, who had assembled to re-
nominate him for Congress.  The Lecompton Constitution, he 
said “would have entailed upon that virgin territory [of Kansas] 
the curse of Slavery.”  Turning the election of 1858 into a 
referendum on this issue alone, Haskin accused Buchanan, his 
fellow Democrat, of abandoning the platform upon which he 
was elected.  Taking cues from Douglas, Haskin argued that the 
Administration‟s policy of supporting a fraudulent constitution 
denied Kansans the right to exercise democratic control over 
local issues.  Prominent Westchester Democrats, ex-Whigs, 
Republicans, and Know-Nothings agreed with Haskin.  
According to Robert H. Coles, an ex-Barnburner Democrat 
from New Rochelle who attended the meeting, Haskin 
“exposed one of the most…shameful swindles that was ever 
perpetuated upon the Government.” Should his opponents 
“succeed in disturbing and dividing our party, a wound will be 
opened that will bleed more profusely than the wounds of 
bleeding Kansas.”89  
The partisan Democratic press not only opened these 
wounds, they also poured salt into them.  “We are perfectly 
willing that the Republicans should take [Haskin] up and adopt 
him as their own,” said Fenelon Hasbrouck, a Peekskill 
Democratic editor who called for his fellow Democrat‟s 
resignation from Congress.  In White Plains, the Second 
Assembly District convention adopted a resolution condemning 
Haskin for his “adulterous communion with unscrupulous 
Black Republicans, or Bastard Know-Nothings.”  In the first 
and third assembly districts as well, Democrats met to condemn 
Haskin for breaking with the national administration at a time 
when the major parties were still in flux.  In April 1858, 
Sutherland observed that Haskin was “languishing in the loving 
embraces of Black Republicanism…he has excited disgust in 
the minds of a large proportion of his constituents, who feel 
that he has enacted the part of a betrayer of his party.”  These 
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vitriolic editorials continued throughout the summer and drove 
a wedge through the county Democratic Party.
90
 
What particularly incensed Westchester‟s Democratic 
establishment was Republican support for Haskin.  “I only 
mean to make sure that Haskin shall be returned,” Horace 
Greeley confided to a friend in the summer of 1858.  The 
Bedford resident publicly declared his support at the 
Republican Congressional Convention, where the Committee 
on Resolutions, which he chaired, reported that “Haskin 
notably resisted every inducement to give his voice and vote 
for the enslavement of Kansas….By thus discharging his 
imperative duty as the representative of a free labor 
constituency,” he had become an ideological ally with 
Republicans, who published his name at the top of their ticket.  
“We have only to choose between Mr. Haskin and a full blown 
Lecompton Democrat. The election of a Republican is an 
impossibility,” the Yonkers Examiner conceded before also 
endorsing Haskin. Westchester Republicans had ample political 
cover to support a Democrat, for Haskin was now “independent 
of administrative requirements and party trammels.”  Though 
Westchester Republican leaders, especially Greeley, were 
motivated by policy considerations to endorse Haskin, electoral 
strategy also factored into this momentous decision.  
Supporting anti-Administration Democrats, they hoped, would 
divide the party and pave the way for a Republican victory in 
the 1860 Presidential contest.
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Consistent with their embrace of anti-Lecompton 
Democrats, Republican leaders and editors now refused to 
compromise with members of the fledging American Party.  
“No fusion should take place whereby the Republican Party 
shall sacrifice…its central principle of opposition to slavery,” 
Rowe declared, though the local party welcomed nativists who 
shared the free labor ideology.  Westchester Republicans did 
not incorporate into their platform nativist or temperance 
policies.  After American and Republican Party leaders failed 
to unite on strong anti-slavery language at the statewide 
nominating conventions, Rowe rationalized that his party stood 
“better today because we have not incumbered ourselves with 
unsympathizing comrades.”  Sutherland, of course, spun this 
impasse as a victory for his party.  County Know-Nothings, he 
editorialized, “regard any sort of connection with Black 
Republicanism as political prostitution, and are fast arranging 
themselves on the side of the National [pro-Buchanan] 
Democracy.”  An August declaration by Know-Nothing 
Council #32 in Peekskill repudiating Haskin‟s stance on 
Lecompton seemed to confirm Sutherland‟s analysis.  Though 
most Democratic candidates won in the 1858 contest, the local 
electorate was sufficiently anti-Lecompton to reward Haskin‟s 
independence with a second term in Congress.
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As Democrats and Republicans took their seats in the 
Thirty-Sixth Congress, in the summer and fall of 1859, 
sectional discord hurtled towards climax over the slavery 
extension issue.  Abolitionist John Brown sought to stir up a 
slave revolt by raiding a federal garrison in Harper‟s Ferry, 
Virginia.  Horace Greeley distributed Hinton Helper‟s The 
Impending Crisis of the South, in which a southern farmer 
argued that slavery blocked economic growth in his section. 
And Haskin continued opposing Buchanan‟s Lecompton 
                                                        
92
 Yonkers Examiner, Aug. 25, Sep. 15, 1858; Eastern State 
Journal, Aug. 20, 1858; George P. Marshall and E.L. Hyatt, 
“At a meeting of Council #32, held in Peekskill…” Aug. 19, 
1858 in Highland Democrat, Aug. 28, 1858; Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, Slavery Law and Politics: The Dred Scott Case 
in Historical Perspective (New York, 1981), 264; Foner, Free 
Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 254. 
59  
 
policy, proclaiming that he would “sooner co-operate with that 
[Republican] party than with those who have…endeavored to 
force a slave State into the Union.”  These three events helped 
re-orient the parties as sectional organizations, convinced the 
South that the North would stop at nothing to destroy slavery, 
and, according to Westchester Democrats, threatened the 
Union, which they feared “cannot hold together under the 
pressure of…Helper and John Brown.”93 
The stakes for the 1860 Presidential election had been 
set.  Edmund Sutherland, editor of the most widely circulated 
county paper, astutely predicted that the contest  “will reduce 
the political elements of the district and County into two 
parties.”  On the one side, the Democratic Party was paralyzed 
regarding slavery: though the Westchester party opposed 
extending slavery to the territories, southerners who wanted to 
secure those rights dominated the national organization. Fed up 
with decades of infighting in county, state, and nation, the 
Highland Democrat lamented, “party strife has…assailed the 
most sacred compacts of our Union.”  On the other side, the 
Republican Party stood in favor of abolishing slavery in 
western territories and in favor of free labor, which included 
Whiggish economic policies such as a protective tariff and 
internal improvements.  Choosing a new President was, 
according to one editor, “the most important crisis through 
which the country has been allowed to pass.”  At risk was “the 
perpetuity of the Union of these States.”94  
No campaign typified Democratic infighting better 
than that of 1860.  New York Democrats failed to coalesce 
around a single candidate for the highest office in the entire 
country.  In July, the party assembled at Schenectady, about 
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twenty miles west of Albany, to nominate a so-called People‟s 
Union Ticket of presidential electors pledged against Abraham 
Lincoln.  They hoped that a composite ticket of electors for 
Douglas, Breckinridge, and John Bell, the Constitutional Union 
candidate, would prevent Lincoln from securing New York‟s 
crucial thirty-five electoral votes.  Indeed, had Lincoln lost the 
entire South and the Empire State, he would have been left with 
145 pledged electors—just seven shy of victory.  The election 
would then be thrown to the House of Representatives where a 
Democrat could have won.  Which Democrat was unimportant, 
contended Sutherland, for “the defeat of Lincoln is the great 
object to be effected.”95 
The campaign quickly became ugly, even by 
nineteenth-century standards.  Westchester Democrats lobbed 
racist volleys against Lincoln by suggesting that a Republican 
victory would usher in black equality, “dragging [whites] down 
to his low and bestial capacity.”  Talk of “Black 
Republicanism” became commonplace.  When it came to 
slavery policy, Westchester Democrats ignored the issue and 
focused on developing industry, preserving nebulous 
“economic rights,” and building a railroad to the Pacific.  But 
each of these issues was wrapped up in sectional controversy.  
Would the transcontinental railroad, for example, pass through 
free or slave territory?  The Schenectady platform avoided this 
key question.
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Republicans adopted a platform demonstrating that 
by the end of the 1850s, the ethno-cultural issues that had 
broken up the Second Party System had faded into the 
background.  Though the Yonkers Examiner had supported 
New Yorker William H. Seward for the 1860 nomination, the 
editor touted Lincoln‟s compelling life story and anti-slavery 
credentials after the Illinoisan secured the nomination.  Rowe 
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rejected black equality but argued that extending slavery to the 
territories placed hard-working whites at an economic 
disadvantage.  Popular sovereignty was not an acceptable 
alternative because it was “destructive to law and order” by 
frequently degenerating into deadly conflicts brought on by 
outside agitators.  In fact, Rowe‟s views more closely 
paralleled the moderate Lincoln‟s than the radical Seward‟s.  
Though his party had never won a major election in 
Westchester, Rowe clearly drew the battle lines for the 
Presidential contest.
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Lincoln swept the northern states on his way to a 
landslide victory.  But in Westchester, the 
Democratic/Constitutional Union slate bested that of the 
Republicans by about 10% of the vote.  This rejection of 
Republicanism took no Westchesterite by surprise; after all, the 
county Democratic Party had won the previous four elections.  
Nevertheless, Republicans rejoiced and Democrats sulked.  
Westchester Democrats regretted the result, “not so much on 
party grounds, as for the continued peace and prosperity of the 
country.”  The most important question confronting 
Westchesterites—and all Americans—in the wake of the first 
Republican presidential victory was whether Lincoln should 
“attempt by force of arms to coerce [the South] back, and thus 
plunge the country into all the horrors of a civil war.”  Though 
Sutherland hated Lincoln, he nonetheless concluded that the 
Union, “which cost our fathers so much toil and sacrifices and 
blood to establish,” was worth preserving.  On this much, both 
parties agreed.
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 Yet during the loose party times of the 1850s, the 
Democratic Party dominated Westchester County‟s politics.  
The candidate at the top of their ticket lost only two elections 
during the decade—both to a third party that did not survive 
past 1858.  Although the Republican Party emerged out of the 
chaos of the 1850s as the northern sectional party, Westchester 
remained an anomalous bastion of anti-Lincoln voters.  
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Proximity to New York City accounted for much of this 
sentiment.  As Westchester transitioned from rural to 
suburban, the county was pulled into the City‟s political orbit.  
And City-dwellers, just like their neighbors to the north, 
overwhelmingly favored the Democrats.   
The local transition from the Second to Third Party 
Systems, moreover, produced unique political alignments.  
Perhaps no other northern county saw Republicans fuse with 
Democrats to counter the Know-Nothings.  Three years later, 
Westchester Republicans again endorsed an anti-slavery 
Democrat for Congress rather than nominate one of their own.  
These two fusions demonstrated that Westchesterites voted for 
people who shared their ideology instead of consistently 
supporting a particular political party.  The county‟s 
experience with Know-Nothingism also illustrated this 
peculiar trend.  Whereas most historians view the nativist 
party as a stepping-stone from the Whigs to the Republicans, 
Westchester Know-Nothings primarily held Democratic 
antecedents.  When the Know-Nothings disintegrated after the 
1858 elections, its supporters, who most ardently embraced 
the party‟s ideology, migrated almost entirely back into the 
Democratic fold. Fluid party affiliation weakened political 
organizations, facilitating the massive realignment of the 
1850s. 
Ethno-cultural issues bear primary responsibility for 
realigning Westchester‟s electorate.  Examining issues 
affecting everyday life, such as nativism and temperance, 
reveals that the Whig Party began unraveling well before the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act passed in 1854.  The Democratic Party, 
too, suffered from fissures generated not by slavery, but by 
Erie Canal financing, the Maine Law, and antiparty sentiment.  
Slavery may have led to the ultimate extinction of the Second 
Party System on the national level, but state and local 
campaigns in off-year elections, such as the unusual 1855 
contest, profoundly influenced political realignments.  Know-
Nothings elevated ethno-cultural issues to thrive in 
Westchester during two non-Presidential elections.  This party, 
in turn, siphoned voters from the Whigs and Democrats, 
challenged the nascent Republican Party, and led to the 
Second Party System‟s mortality.  It is impossible to tell the 
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story of how these four nationally competitive political parties 
divided, disintegrated, or formed without considering forces 
operating on the county and town levels.  Most voters had 
closer ties with elected officials at home than with those in 
Washington, and thus ethno-cultural and financial issues—the 
stuff of local politics—induced voters to flee from the Whig 
Party and to change the complexion of the Democratic Party. 
Towards the end of the 1850s, however, ethno-
cultural issues had lost salience.  By 1856, slavery consumed 
political affairs at all levels of government, filled the editorial 
pages of Westchester‟s partisan press, and strengthened the 
Republican Party pledged to preserve the principle of free 
labor.  John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, was one of the first Westchesterites to join the 
local party.  On the eve of the 1860 election, Jay addressed a 
meeting of county Republicans in Bedford, down the block 
from the Post Office where William Robertson had cast his 
ballot in 1848.  “It will be wise for the slaveholders, instead of 
harping on dissolution, to prepare for the abolition of slavery,” 
he suggested, “not by the action of the Republican party, but 
by the operation of natural laws, that neither individuals nor 
parties can restrain.”  Although Jay‟s appeal did not sway his 
fellow Westchesterites to support Lincoln in 1860, the “natural 
laws” he cited ultimately triumphed over party and sectional 
divisions during the Civil War, culminating in emancipation 
and Union war victory.  During the 1850s, Westchesterites 
transcended, blurred, and erased party lines regarding dozens 
of issues—most prominently on nativism, temperance, and 
slavery.  After these ten years of loose party times, they again 
subordinated partisanship to principle.  When the south 
seceded, Westchesterites finally found a universal rallying 
point: saving the very Union that gave birth to their political 
parties.
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Westchester County Newspapers: Parties and 
Editors 
 
Newspaper Party Editor 
Eastern State Journal Democratic (Barnburner, Hard) Edmund G. Sutherland 
Highland Democrat Democratic Fenelon Hasbrouck 
Hudson River Chronicle Whig (Silver Gray)/American William Howe 
Peekskill Republican Whig (Sewardite)/Republican J.J. Chambers 
Westchester Herald Democratic (Hunker, Hard) Caleb Roscoe 
Westchester Gazette Nonpartisan/Temperance Eugene Hyde; John Cogswell 
Yonkers Examiner Republican M.F. Rowe 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1853-
1854 
  Whig Soft Dem. Hard Dem. Know-Nothing 
1853 (Sec. of State) 39.5 21.7 39.8 -- 
1854 (Governor) 25.8 30.9 5.7 37.6 
 
Table 3. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1854-
1855 
  Whig Soft Dem. Hard Dem. Know-Nothing Republican 
1854 (Governor) 25.8 30.9 5.7 37.6 -- 
1855 (Sec. of State) -- 7 32.0 38.7 22.3 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1855-
1856 
 
  Republican Soft Dem. Hard Dem. Know-Nothing 
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1855 (Sec. of State) 22.3 7.0 32.0 38.7 
1856 (President) 35.3 36.4 28.3 
 
Table 5. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1856-
1857 
 
 Republican Democratic Know-Nothing 
1856 (President) 35.3 36.4 28.3 
1857 (Sec. of State) 27.5 52.6 19.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
